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Ozler studied changes in spreads on bank loans  ing information about borrowers and the lend-
to developing countries during 1968-81.  ers' inability to distinguish different types (t
borrowers in advance.  Indeed, intemational
She found that a borrower's experience had  institutions have been doing more of this fact-
a significant impact on spreads.  Spreads started  finding since the onset of the debt crisis.
at high values at low levels of loan experience
and decreased as experience increased. Spreads  The study was based on loan-.evel data for
at initial-experience levels were about 30 per-  1968-81, when the Eurocunrency market was
cent above benchmark rates and declined to the  expanding.  Data on renegotiated loans were not
benchmark, with experience.  The impact of ex-  used.  The results are robust to a number of
perience became negligible with 30 prior loans.  altemative specifications. They are not a
consequence of the behavior of spreads over
Ozler suggests a greater role for intema-  calendar time, but are robust with altemative
tional organization, in collecting and dissemi-  definitions of experience variables and altema-
nating infortation  about potential borrowers - tive functional forms.
because of the high initial fixed cost of collect-
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I.  Introduction
The  developing  country  debt  crisis  of the  last  decade  has raised  a
number  of questions  related  to  the  pricing  of loans,  such  as  whether  the
lenders  considered  the  economic  conditions  of the  borrowers,  or their
historical  repayment  record,  in setting  the  terms  on loans. In  fact  ic  has
been empirically  demonstrated  that  the  rates  charged  on developing  country
loans  reflected  both  the  economic  condition  of the  borrowers  and  their
historical  repayment  record  (For  applications  concerning  the  loans  in  1970
see  Feder  and  Just (1977),  Edwards  (1984),  6zler  (1988a);  for  a study  of
loans  in 1930s  see  Eichengreen  and  Portes  (1986)). None  of these  studies,
however,  have explicitly  considered  that  each  borrower  after  initially
entering  the  market,  typically  borrowed  repeatedly  thereafter.  Did  the
repeated  experience  of a  borrower  affect  the  evolution  of credit  terms  in
the  Eurocurrency  markets? Did  the  rates  borrowers  contracted  in their
initial  loans  differ  systematically  from  the  rates  contracted  later  in  the
same  market? The  purpose  of this  study  is  to  provide empirical  answers  to
these  questions.
Early  empirical  studies  on credit  terms  primarily  focused  on the
relation  between  spreads  (the  difference  of the interest  rate  charged  to a
country  and  the  base interest  rate)  and  various  economic  indicators  of the
borrowers  that  presumably  reflect  their  default  risk (see  Feder  and  Just
(1977),  Edwards  (1984,  1986)).' A menu  of  variables,  such  as investment  to
GNP ratio,  debt  service  to  exports  ratio,  rate  of inflation,  GNP  growth,
have  been  considered  to  measure  default  risk. It  has  been  demonstrated  that
annual  average  spreads  contracted  with countries  reflect  various  measures  of
default  risk  r;onsidered. 2 These  earlier  empirical  studies  are  based  on  mod-
els  of lending  where  rational  lenders  are  assumed  to operate  in  a perfectly2
competitive  market,  but facing  default  risk (see  for  example  Eaton  and
Gersovitz  (1981),  Cooper  and  Sachs  (1985),  Sachs  and  Cohen(1985)).
An attempt  to  determine  whether repeated  experience  of a country  had
an affect  on the  behaviour  of credit  terms  requires  detailed  information  on
the  loan  contracts  signed  by the  countries. The  data  set  employed  contains
information  on commercial  bank  loans  from  Euroci.rrency  credit  markets.
Three  aspects  of this  data  set  are  important  to  note.  First,  since  the
rates  contracted  in  early  stages  of  borrowing  may differ  from  those  contrac-
ted  later,  we incorporate  information  on  early  loan  contracts.3  Second,
since  we are  concerned  with the  evolution  of the  market,  and  we want  to
avoid  problems  surrounding  the  debt  crisis  we limit  the  data  to  a period
before  the  general  debt  crisis  of 1982. Third,  we do  not include  informa-
tion  on renegotiated  debt. This is  because  we are  concerned  with  the
operation  of the  Eurocurrency  market  for  countries  that  have  not  experienced
repayment  difficulties  on their  commercial  bank loans. Accordingly,  we
assembled  a loan  level  data  for  55  countries  during  1968  to  mid-1981  (2148
bank loans). The  data  include  information  on the  terms  of the  loan
contracts  signed,  as  well  as the  month  and  year of the  loan  agreeement.  A
measure  of repeated  experience  is simply  defined  as the  cumulative  number  of
months  in  which  the  borrower  received  a loan  (other  definitions  are  also
employed  as  will  be presented  later  in the  paper). The  experience  variable
is  distinct  from  a cumulative  number  of  months  over  calender  time since  the
countries  in the  sample  have  different  entry  dates  (Chile  in  October  1968,
Zimbabwe  November  1980).
The  primary  finding  is that  the  experience  level  of a  borrower
contributes  significantly  to the  determination  of the  spreads. Specifical-
ly,  the  spreads  are  shown  to start  at rates  that  are  higher  than  would  be3
predicted  by benchmark  models  in  which  only  observable  economic
characteristics  are  accounted  for  (benchmark  models  are  similar  to those
employed  in  earlier  empirical  studies  by Feder  and  Just (1977)  and  Edwards
(1984)). In  particular,  it is found  that  at initial  experience  levels
spreads  are  approximately  30  percent  above  the  rates  that  are  predicted  by
the  benchmark  models  and  that  the  spreads  decline  to  the  benchmark  rate.
An interpretation  of these  results  can  be provided  by a  model  of
reputation  acquisition  as developed  by Diamond  (1989). In  his  model
initially  there  is  an observationally  equivalent  cohort  of borrowers  with  no
track  record. There  are  different  types  of  borrowers  depending  upon  their
access  to  risky  or safe  projects. Lenders  inability  to distinguish  them
leads  to  different  types  being  lumped  together  and  initially  treated
identically.  Given  the  proportions  of  different  types  of  borrowers  in  the
initial  period,  lenders  set  the  interest  rates  to receive  a competitive
expected  return. It is  assumed  that  default  leads  to  a cutoff  of credit  and
hence  the  class  of nondefaulters  is  now  a more  select  group. Accordingly
the  interest  rates  charged  in the  next  loans  is  less  than  the  initial  rate
and  this  decline  continues  over  time  for  the  class  of  nondefaulters.
One  way of interpreting  the  experience  variable  employed  in this  study
is to  consider  it as 'good'  experience.  This interpretation  is  consistent
with the  institutional  details  of international  lending. Typically,  count-
ries  initially  borrowed  from  the  competitive  Eurocurency  credit  markets. If
countries  experienced  repayment  difficulties,  however,  they  had to  enter  a
rescheduling  process. Most  reschedulings  typically  restricted  further
borrowing  from  capital  markets,  and  the  terms  on  postponed  loans  as  well  as
the  new  loans  that  were  part  of  a rescheduling  agreement  were  negotiated
between  the  existing  creditors  and  the  borrower. In fact,  during  the  period4
under  consideration,  the  spreads  on rescheduled  loans  were  more  than  twice
those  on  new loans.4 Our  data  includes  information  only  on  market  loans.
Another  interpratation  of the  empirical  finding  would  be based  on some
sort  of  high initial  cost  of lending. For  example,  lenders  may  directly
invest  in information  collection  to  observe  the  attributes  of the  borrowers.
Assuming  that  gathering  this  information  has  high initial  costs  (and  long-
term  debt  contracts  do  not  exist),  the  spreads  charged  are  initially  higher
than  the  spreads  in  the  absence  of such  costs. The incremental  information
required  will,  however,  decrease  as experience  with a  borrower  accumulates.
This  would  lead  spreads  to decline  toward  the  spr'ads  that  would  prevail  in
the  absence  of such  costs.
The  paper  is  organised  as follows: In  section  two,  data  and  the  method
of estimation  are  presented,  results  are  in  section  three,  and  summary  and
concluding  remarks  are in  section  four.
II.  Empirical  Issues
A.  ExDerience  and  Spread: A Cursory  Look  at the  Data
As indicated  above,  most  developing  countries  borrowed  repeatedly  once
they  entered  the  commercial  bank  market. The  evolution  of spreads  with
experience  is  displayed  in  Figures  1-3,  where  experience  is defined  as the
cumulative  number  of prior  months  in  which  the  country  borrowed. (The
sources  and the  characteristics  of the  data  are  discussed  in Section  C).  To
obtain  Figure  1,  normalized  spreads  are  constructed  from  the  actual  spreads,
first,  by dividing  the  actual  spreads  of each  country  by the  mean  spread  of
all  loans  to that  country. Second,  at each  level  of  experience  the  average
of  normalized  spreads  across  countries  is  calculated.  Finally,  these  aver-
ages  are  smoothed  by an  averaging  routine  to  aid  visualization. 55
In this  figure,  two  patterns  are immediately  noticeable. First,  the
spread  at low  levels  of experience  is  higher  than  average  (unity). Second,
as  experience  increases,  the  spread  tends  to A zline,  but  in a  very cyclical
pattern.
These  cyclical  patterns  can  in fact  be shown  to  be a coincidental
consequence  of the  cyclical  pattern  of spreads  over  calendar  time. This  can
be seen  in  Figure  2 for  which  spreads  are  constructed  in  the  same  way to
those  in  Figure  1, except  the  averages  are  taken  at  each  calendar  time. The
cycl,  'ehavior  here is significantly  more  pronounced  than  in Figure  1.
The  dampening  of the  cyclical  pattern  in Figure  1 is  of course  due  to
countries  having  different  entry  dates  to the  market.
To clarify  the  evolution  of spreads  with experience,  we implemented  a
simple  procedure: a regression  is run  in  which  the  spread  is the  dependent
variable,  and  the  only  explanatory  variables  are  the  dummy  variables  for
each  month.6 The  residuals  from  this  regression  are  treated  in  the  same
manner  as  were the  spreads  for  Figures  1 and  2.  Figure  3  displays  the
relation  between  these  constructed  residuals  and  experience.
It is  quite  interesting  to  note that  the  cyclical  pattern  apparent  in
Figure  1 is  no longer  prominent. The  normalized  residuals  in'itally  lie  well
above  unity,  declining  toward  it  until  the  experience  level  reaches  near
twenty. This  result  in itself  strongly  indicates  that  experience  plays  a
major  role. To eliminate  nther  possible  correlations,  we next  turn  to  a more
systematic  investigation  o. the  relation  between  spreads  and  experience.
B.  Methodology
1.  Credit  Terms  in the  Eurocurrency  Market
It  h  .s  been  postulated  that  the  spreads  reflect  the  probabilities  of
default  of a particular  country  (see  Feder  and  Just (1977),  Eaton  and6
Gersovitz  (1981),  Sachs  (1981)  and  see  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1986)  for  a review
of others). In these  formulations,  however,  no role  for  experience  has  been
allowed. Our discussion  of the  existing  models  of spread  determination  will
be followed  by a dircussion  of  how  we employ  experience  with  a borrower  to
alter  the  standard  specification.
Suppose  that  the  Eurocurrency  market  is  best  described  as  perfectly
competitive  and  that  risk-neutral  lender  banks  maximize  expected  returns  by
optimally  choosing  the  spreads.7 Expected  returns  can  be formulated  as
follows: First,  consider  the  return  assuming  the  loan  is  rep&id  according
to the  contract. To formulate  this  suppose  that  a loan  of amount L  is
made  for  T  periods  to  be repaid  in  one  installment  at maturity  and  servi-
ced  at equal  installments  until  maturity. If  s  is the  spread  then  the  net
revenue  received  each  period  throughout  the  duration  of the  contract  is  sL.
Suppose  that  the  cost  of capital  is  i*,  then  discounted  future  revenue  is
expressed  by (for  notational  convenience,  the  subscripts  that  would  indicate
country-  and  time-periods  are  not  employed):
T
sL  t _ sLq  (1)
t-l  (l+i*)
T  -t
where  q - q(i*,T)  * E (1+i*)
t-l
If there  is  a failure  to  fulfill  the  contract,  then  the  rate  of loss  is  h,
a random  variable.
Let  p(X)  represent  the  probability  that  the  borrower  will fail  to
fulfill  the  contract,  with A  incorporating  a set  of economic  indicators
that  determines  the  probability  (the  specification  of the  elements  of the  x°
vector  will  be left  to  the  data  section). The  market  equilibrium  condition7
yields  the  following  relation:
P  fi  (2) 71-p)  q
where h - expected  loss  rate.
In implementing  this  model  empirically  the  convention  (Feder  and  Just
(1977)  and  Edwards  (1984))  regarding  the  functional  form  of  p,  has  been to
assume  that  p  has a logistic  form:
p  J-k  (2a)
1  +  exp[0 0 +  j-l  0  )
where  k  is  the  dimension  of  ^.  Equation  (2)  can,  therefore,  easily  be
rewritten  in  the  logarithmic  form.
The  expected  loss  rate  in  the  event  of default  is  not directly
observable. If the  expected  loss  rate  is  constant  over  time  and  countries
then  the  intercept  term  would  capture  it.  To capture  the  variations  in it
across  countries  and  over  time,  country-  and  time-specific  dummy  variables
are  incorporated.  Time-specific  dummy  variables  are  also  useful  in captur-
ing  the  changes  in  the  supply  conditions  in  the  Eurocurrency  markets. Hence
the  empirical  specification  of  equation  (2)  is as follows:
k
In s  - +  z  ixj  In q  +  pC +  tT  +  w  (3)
j-1
where  P-o  + n h
C - dummy  variable  that  is one  when  country  is  c,
T - dummy  variable  that  is one  when  time  is  t,
w - error  term  with  zero  expected  value.8
2.  Credit  Terms  and  AN2erience  with  the  Borrowers
Previous  investigations  of  credit  terms  are  based  on specifications
that  are  similar  to the  one  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  and  therefore
omit  the  contribution  that  repeated  experience  with  a  borrower  in  credit
markets  may  have  on the  determination  of the  credit  terms. Accordingly,
here  we modify  the  above  specification  to incorporate  information  about
experience:
k
Xn s  - +  E  ,xj  - In q  + p  c +  P T + I  ln(1+1/X)  + w  (4)
i1-i
where: X - experience  measured  as a positi.ve  integer.
Let  us define  ln s*  as the  benchmark  rate  that  would  be predicted  in  a
model  without  employing  the  experience  variable. Accordingly,  if  'Y  - 0  is
found,  then  spreads  are  always  equal  to  the  spreads  predicted  by the  bench-
mark  model.  - >  0  indicates  that  at low  levels  of experience  with a
borrower,  spreads  are  higher  than  the  predicted  rates  while  7  <  0
indicates  the  opposite.
The  choice  of the  above  functional  form  for  experience,  i.e.,  a general
hyperbolic  form  s  - s* (l+l/X)I,  was  motivated  by a  number  of considera-
tions. First,  the  cursory  inspection  of the  data  as  presented  in  Figure  3,
was suggestive  of  hyperbolic  form  with  I  >  0.  Second, we want  to impose  a
theoretical  restriction  that  even  if the  rates  cont  . ted  may  deviate  from
s*,  as  X  increases  the  rates  should  come  to reflect s*.  Finally,  the
hyperbolic  form  lends  itself  to  be easily  estimated  with  a linear  model.
The  hyperbolic  form  is  somewhat  unsatisfactory  despite  lending  itself
to the  linear  form  in equation  (4). This  is  primarily  because  the  same
parameter  determines  the  intercept  as  well as the  slope  of the  experience9
term.  Furthermore  the  estimates  involving  the  hyperbolic  form  will  be
sensitive  to  how  the  experience  variable  is  scaled. A functional  form  that
is  not  subject  to these  criticisms  is the  two  parameter  Pade'  form:
s  - s* ((+a)  - bX  () 1+(b/a)  X
The  above  form  has the  virtue  that  as X increases s/8*  smoothly  converges
from  its  initial  value  (l+a) to the  asymptotic  value  unity.8 (The  behav-
ior  of these  functional  forms  based  on our  estimates  is  presented  later.)
C.  DA.t
1.  Sources  and  Discussion  of  Variables
Models  similar  to (4)  and (5)  are  estimated,  employing  loan  level  data
for  the  period  of 1968  to  mid-1981. The  data  incorporates  information  about
the  loans  as  well as  borrowers'  characteristics.  Information  on the  loans
consists  of the  identity  of the  borrower,  the  time  of the  loan,  its  terms,
and  some  qualitative  aspects  such  as  whether  the  loan  is  public. Loans  data
for  the  1973-81  period  is  obtained  from  the  various  issues  of the  World
Bank's  Borrowing  in International  Capital  Markets. The  data  for  the  prior
period,  however,  has  been obtained  through  an exhaustive  search  of the  fin-
ancial  press  as  well  as the  central  bank  reports  of the  borrower  countries.
We have included  only  $U.S.  denominated  loans  that  have  variable  interest
rates  and  that  have LIBOR  (London  Interbank  Offer  Rate)  as the  base rate.
These  restrictions  are  incorporated  to  avoid  complications  that  may  arise
from  comparisons  across  different  types  of financial  instruments.  Further-
more,  the  data  are  constrained  to include  borrowers  that  have taken  at least
three  loans. Finally,  since  this  paper  is  concerned  with  expansion  of the
market  and  we want  to avoid  problems  surrounding  the  debt  crisis,  we limit
the  data  to the  period  ending  in mid-1981. After  these  restrictions,  the10
data  set  contains  information  on 2148  loans  to 55  developing  countries  that
were  made  betw.en  1968  and  June 1981. Since  much  has  been  written  on the
general  nature  of these  loans  they  will  not  be further  discussed  here.  How-
ever,  the  Appendix  Table  A.1  contains  information  on some  characteristics  of
our  data.
Some  information  on the  loars  are  among  the  elements  of the _  vector
in equation  (4). These  include  maturity  of the  loan,  a dummy  variable  that
indicates  whether  the  loan  is  public,  and  finally  a dummy  variable  that
indicates  if the  loan  is  syndicated.  A possible  problem  could  arise  from  the
inclusion  of  maturity  to the  extent  that  banks  determine  spread  and  maturity
simultaneously.  However,  based  upon  practices  in the  Eurocurrency  market  and
the  previous  literature,  loan  maturity  is  assumed  to  be determined  prior  to
the  spread  determination  (see  Feder  and  Just (1977),  Edwards  (1984)).
Some  borrowers'  characteristics  are  also included  in  the  _  vector.
These  include  information  on  general  economic  conditions  of the  borrower  and
are  presumably  important  in  measuring  the  riskiness  of the  borrower. We
employed  variables  that  are  similar  to the  ones  employed  in  the  previous
studies  of credit  terms  and  these  variables  are:  total  debt-to-GNP  ratio,
debt  service-to-exports  ratio,  reserves-to-GNP  ratio,  imports  to  GNP ratio,
GNP growth,  lagged  value  of investment  to  GNP ratio,  rate  of devaluation  and
rate  of inflation.9  The total  debt,  and  debt  service  variables  are  obtained
from  the  World  Bank's  World  Debt  Tables. The  remaining  variables  are
obtained  from  IMF's  International  Financial  Statistics.
The  expected  signs  of these  indicators  have  been  discussed  extensively
in the  literature  (  for  reviews  see  McDonough  (1982),  Eaton  and  Taylor
(1986)  and  Edwards  (1984)),  hence  we will  only  briefly  comment  on this
issue. It has  been suggested  that  total  debt  to  GNP  ratio  will  have  a11
positive  sign,  since  it is  considered  as an indicator  of solvency  for  a
country  (note  that  total  debt  includes  the  entire  stock  of debt,  not  just
the  amount  contracted  by the  commmercial  banks). Liquidity  problems  faced
by countries  will  be measured  by  the  ratio  of debt  service  to exports  and
it  is expected  that  the  coefficient  of this  variable  will  be positive. If
reserves  to  GNP  ratio  is an indicator  of the  level  of international  liquid-
ity  of a country  it  will  have  a negative  sign. Ratio  of investment  to  GNP
will  be negatively  related  to spreads,  since  it indicates  the  prospects  of  a
countries  future  growth. Ratio  of imports  to  GNP is  expected  to  have a
positive  sign  to  the  extent  that  it  measures  the  vulnerability  of a country
to outside  shocks. Higher  rate  of growth  is  argued  to  result  in lower
probability  of  non-payment.  High  inflation  is  employed  as an indicator  of a
larger  probability  of  balance  of payments  crisis. Rate  of devaluation  is
used  to measure  a country's  willingness  to  use  exchange  rate  adjustments  to
avoid  balance  of  payments  crisis.
2.  The  ExRerience  Variable
The  remaining  variable,  denoted X  above,  must  provide  a  measure  of
experience. There  is  not  an  obvious  unique  definition,  however, we have
attempted possible  definitions  of  X  that  seemed  reasonable,  constrained
by the  fact  that  only  the  month,  size  and  specific  borrower  are  known.
Accordingly,  the  following  definitions  of the  experience  variable X  were
employed.
Xl - The  cumulative  number  of loans  to  a  particular  borrower.
X2 - The  cumulative  number  of months  in  which  the  borrower  received  a loan.
X3 - Same  as 1, except  that  loans  taken  in  the  same  month  are  assigned  the
same  value.12
X4 - Cumulative  number  of  months,  irrespective  of  whether  a loan  was
secured  in  each,  since  the  month  of the  first  lending.
X5 - Loan  amount  of each  loan  contract  to  GNP  ratio  for  a  particular
borrower  expressed  cumulatively.
X6 - Same  as 2,  but  on a regional  basis: the  cumulative  number  of  months  in
which  any  borrower  in  a geographic  region  (i.e.,  Latin  America,  Asia,
Middle  East,  Africa,  and  Europe)  has  received  a loan.
III. Results
In this  section,  we present  and  discuss  a series  of  estimation  repults
that  investigate  the  relation  between  experience  and  spreads. First,  equa-
tion (4)  is  estimated  for  alternative  definitions  of the  experience  variable
for  the  enLire  sample  of 1968-81,  as  presented  in  Table  1 (in  all  specifica-
tions  we employ  a  month  specific  and  country  specific  dummy  variable
structure  unless  otherwise  noted). Second,  we present  a set  of estimates
for  subsamples  of the  data,  including  only  earlier  periods  such  as 1968-76,
as  presented  in  Table  2.  Third,  results  from  estimations  that  also  include
a  measure  of changing  competitiveness  in  the  market  are  discussed. Fourth,
altenative  cut-off  values  for  the  experience  variables  are  employed,  as
presented  in  Table  3.  Finally,  we estimate  a functional  form  using  equation
(5)  and  compare  the  results  to  the  ones  obtained  from  equation  (4),  as is
presented  in  Table  4.  The interpretation  of the  magnitudes  obtained  from
these  estimations  are  provided  with the  aid  of Figure  4.
The  estimated  magnitudes  and  signs  of the  variables  other  than
experience  variable  will  not  be discussed  here,  since  there  is  already  a
substantial  literature  on them. It is,  however,  important  to  note that  the
findings  concerning  these  variables  are  consistent  with  their  expected  signs13
which  were  discussed  in the  data  section. (The  parameter  estimates  and
their  standard  errors  for  one  specification  are  in  Appendix  Table  A.2.)10
Table  1  presents  the  estimation  results  of  equation  (4)  employing
alternative  definitions  of the  experience  variable.  In this  Table,  Xl-X3,
which  are  all  based  on counting  the  number  of loans,  are  near  7  - 0.25
with  large  "t"  values. 11'12 The  interpretation  of this  magnitude  for  the
hyperbolic  form  employed  is  beet  demonstrated  in  Figure  4.  Figure  4  plots
s/s* by experience  where  s*  is the  benchmark  rate.  In this  figure,  when
7 - .25, at initial  levels  of experience  the  spread  is 20%  higher  than  the
benchmark  rate. As experience  reaches  near  thirty,  however,  the  spread
reaches  the  benchmark  rate.
Estimations  employing  X4-X6  definitions  of the  experience  variables  are
also  in  Table  1.  X4 is estimated  with a small  "t"  value,  as  well as  a small
parameter  estimate. This  result  suggests  that  the  total  number  of  months
since  the  borrower  first  borrowed  in  this  market  do  not  contribute  to the
determination  of the  spreads. Instead,  the  number  of repeated  trips  to the
lender  is  found  significant,  as is indicated  by the  behaviour  of Xl-X3
variables.
We next investigated  whether  the  cumulative  amounts  contracted  in  the
repeated  trips  to  borrow  had  an impact  on the  spreads. This  is  done  by
employing  the X5  variable,  which  is  created  by cumulating  the  ratio  of the
amounts  contracted  to  GNP.  Amounts  are  scaled  with  GNP prior  to  cumulation
so  as  to  generate  a  variable  that  measures  the  relative  importance  of  the
amount  contracted  for  an  individual  borrower.  As  seen  in  Table  1,  this
variable  has a statistically  significant  impact,  though  the  level  of
confidence  is  not large.14
Finally,  in  Table  1,  we present  the  results  from  an  estimation  that
employs  individual  country  experience  simultaneously  with  an experience
variable  foi.  ihe  region  (here  we present  results  using  X2 definition,  though
the  results  for  other  definitions  are  found  to  be similar  to the  ones
presented  here). These  results  indicate  that  country  experience  continues
to  be important,  however,  the  experience  in the  region  for  the  period  under
consideration  does  not affect  the  behaviour  of the  spreads.
Overall,  the  results  in  Table  1 suggest  that  experience,  measured  as
cumulative  number  of loans  to  a particular  country  and  cumulative  loan
amount  to  GNP  ratio,  is important  in  affecting  the  evolution  of spreads. In
contrast,  total  number  of  months  since  the  first  loan  of the  country,  and
the  experience  of the  countries  that  are  in the  same  geographic  region  have
not  contributed  to the  spreads.
Next,  we investigate  whether  the  findings  in  Table  1,  are  a consequence
of the  change  in the  competitiveness  in  the  market. This  is  of concern
because,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  dramatic  increased  entry  of  new  banks,
in  particular  after  1977,  lowered  the  spreads.13 (The  behaviour  of the
spreads  over  calendar  time  as  presented  in  Figure  2,  may in  fact  be a
consequence  of such  change  in  the  market.)  Since  we attempted  to control
for  time  effect  by employing  time  specific  dummy  variables  in  our  estima-
tions,  and  since  the  borrowers  in our  sample  have  diffent  entry  dates,  we do
not  expect  the  results  discussed  so far  to  be a  mere  consequence  of
increased  entry  of  banks  over  calendar  time. However,  we investigated  this
issue  further. In particular,  we restricted  the  sample  to  periods  earlier
than  1977. As an alternative  we incorporated  a  proxy  for  competitiveness
borrowers  faced  in the  market.15
In Table 2  we present results  based on alternative cut-off values for
the sample.  Instead of employing the entire sample  between 1968-mid 1981,
we have used the sample for 1968-75, 1968-76 and 1968-77.  These results
provide further evidence that it is  not the general decline of the spreads
in the later part of the sample that is driving the results.  Experience
variables contin e to be statistically significant  and important in
magnititude.
As an alternative to restricting the sample to early time periods we
incorporated an additional  variable that proxies for competitiveness each
borrower faces in the market.  Specifically,  the number of banks in the
market is assumed to be an indicator  of overall competitiveness in the
market.  In order to create a measure of the competitiveness a borrower
faced,  we also used information  on the amounts of loans.  The percentage of
loans  made to a country in a particular  year, in that market is calculated,
and multiplied by the number of banks participating in the market during the
same year.  The logarithm of this  variable is then included in the regres-
sion equations.  This variable is estimated  with a negative parameter, -.02,
and with a "t"  value of (-1.95).  The remaining parameters did not show
notable change.  In particular, inclusion of this  variable did not alter the
estimated magnitude and the standard error of the experience parameter (for
X2 variable the parameter estimate and the "t" value are .25  and 2.18,
respectively).  This result also indicates that it is not a change in the
number of banks in the market that is driving the results.
In Table 3, estimations of equation (4)  employing the  X2  subsamples
of the data are presented.  Subsamples  are based on the cutoff points for
the experience variable.  For example, the numbers that correspond to  X2 <
11  are results obtained from constraining our data to the first 1016
experience of all the borrowers in our sample.  Table 3 indicates that the
results are sensitive to the cut-off point, such that  y  declines as the
cut-off value increases.  The systematic effect of the cutoff on  - points
out the weaknesses of this form for treating the observed evolution,  hence
we also employ the Pade' form.
In Table 4, the results from a form that employs the two  parameter
Pade' function (5),  are presented  (along  with the results of equation (4)
for comparison purposes).  Part  A of this table uses the same dummy variable
structure for countries and time periods that has been used in the paper up
to this  point.  Both the intercept and the slope parameters of the Pade'
form are estimated statistically  significantly.  Table 4.B presents the
results of equations with less detailed dummy variable structures, which
indicate only the year and the geographic region of the countries.  The
parameter estimates in Part B are consistent  with the results presented in
Part A.  An F- test,  however, is in favor of the specification  with the
detailed dummy variable structure.  Figure 4 presents plots of the Pade'
form for alternative parameter  values.  In comparison to the hyperbolic
form, the Pade' form  which permits the convergence rate and initial  value to
be independent, starts  higher and descends  more rapidly to  s*.  This form
indicates even higher spread values for initial experience levels, near 32%
above the benchmark.  The results obtained with the two functional forms,
however, are quite similar, as evidenced by Figure 4.
IV.  Conclusions
In this study we have empirically examined the evolution of the spreads
on bank loans to developing countries for thc 1968-81 expansion period.  The
primary finding of this study is that the experience level of a borrower has17
a significant impact on the spreads:  Spreads start at high values at low
levels of experience and decrease as experience increases.  In particular, it
is found that at initial  experience levels spreads are approximately 30
percent above the asymptotic spreads.  The impact of experience  becomes
negligible when experience  reaches near 30  prior loans.  These results are
found to be robust to a number of alternative specifications.  In particular,
the results are not a consequence of the behaviour of spreads over calendar
time, they are robust to alternative definitions of experience  variable
employed and are also robust to alternative functional forms employed.
This finding is important in empirically point out the presence of
distortions in the allocation mechanism of international loan markets.  A
number of alternative interpretations  may be plausible.  In this paper we
have discussed two possible interpretations.  One of them is a high initial
fixed cost argument, which is perhaps incurred  by the lenders to collect
information about the  borrower.  The second interpretation is one of
reputation acquisition  by the borrowers, since lenders are unable to
distinguish different types of borrowers ex-ante.  These types of arguments
would suggest a greater role for international institutions in collecting and
disseminating information.  In fact, such institutions  have been playing a
greater role in this respect since the onset of the debt crisis.18
FOOTNOTES
;In practice, in addition to spreads,  borrowers also pay commission and
fees to the lenders.  Data on these,  however, are not systematically avail-
able, hence these empirical studies rely on spreads only. It is noted,
however, that these costs are low relative to spreads for the period under
consideration (see Edwards (1984,  p. 728) and Cline pp. 82-83).
A number of recent empirical studies investigate the relation between
borrower country characteristics and the formation of secondary prices.  For
a recent study that also incorporates creditor country elements in this
investigation see Ozler and Huizinga (1989).
3The big up-surge in  bank lending  began around 1969-1970 (see  Williams
(1980) for a discussion of the pattern of growth of the market.
4For an explanation of this observation  as well as further discussion of
issues concerning reschedulings see Ozler (1989).
Explicitly, if the actual spread of the ith country's j  loan is  s..,
then the normalized spread  sij =  sij  /<si>,  where  <si>  is the mean spread
charged to the country over the entire 1968-81  period.  Note that the normal-
ized spread is a unitless quantity and can be compared across countries.  The
average over countries, computed at each value of  j,  is simply
p
<Sj>  sij  /p
i=l
where  p  is the number of countries  having at least  j  loans.  The smooth-
ing routine replaces  <s.>  with the quantity  s  where
j+9
s  =  <S  k>/ 1 0
k=j19
6A  cursory  inspection  of the  data  in fact  dictates  that  the  cyclical
pattern  of spreads  over  time  are  related  to  some  global-  and  macroeconomic
events  such  as the  oil  shocks  and industrialized  counrry  growth  rates.
These  two  variables  are  also  correlated  with the  number  of banks  that
entered  the  Eurocurrency  market. Hence  a  more  sophisticated  approach  would
require  a  model  employing  such  variables  to explain  the  spread  behavior  over
time. Since  this  is  beyond  the  purpose  of this  study,  we implemented  this
simpler  approach.
7The  perfect  competition  assumption  is  not  necessary  for  the  empirical
model  derived. A very  similar  model  is  developed  under  the  monopolistic
competitioi  assumption.  See  Feder  and  Just (1977).
8Even  though  this  form  is  not subject  to the  problem  of scaling  it  is
subject  to that  of translation  which  means  it  is sensitive  to changes  of the
origin  for  X.
9This  particular  set  of  variables  was  employed  for  direct  comparibility
to  existing  studies  on credit  terms  (see  Edwards  (1984)). Similar  variables
have  also  been employed  in  the  empirical  literature  as determinants  of
rescheduling  probabilities  (see  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1986)  and  McDonald  (1982)
for  a review. In creating  the  ratios  in  this  study,  we have  employed
monthly  data  where  available.
10We have  presented  the  estimations  for  only  one  of these
specifications.  Others  are  quite  similar  to the  one  presented  and  are
available  from  the  author  upon  request.
11One  may  suspect  that  OLS  estimates  of this  relationship  may  be
inconsistent.  X  and  w  of equation  (4)  may  be correlated  if the
borrower's  choice  of  X  in  part  depends  on the  spread. This,  however,  is
not likely. It is important  to recall  that  most  measures  of the  experience20
are  in terms  of the  frequency  of  borrowing. Inconsistency  would  be a
source  of concern  if the  experience  variables  were  measured  employing
amounts  borrowed.
1 "We have  also  estimated  equation  (4)  with a sample  that  is constrained
to  include  borrowers  that  have  at least  borrowed  10 times  during  1968-81.
The results  are  quite  similar  to the  ones  presented  in  Table  1.  For
example,  for Xl,  y  is  estimated  to  be 0.29  with  a "t"  value  of 2.19.
13See  Devlin  (1977)  for  a discussion  of the  evolution  of the  market
structure.
14The  number  of  banks  is  obtained  from  the  Banker  (November  1983).21
TABLE  1
Equation  (4): -y For  Alternative  Definitions  of Experience
XL  X2  X3  X4  X5
0.26  0.25  0.25  0.09  0.04
(2.49)  (2.19)  (2.41)  (1.00)  (1.97)




R2 of  each  equation  is  near .55.
The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  the  "t"  values.
TABLE  2
Equation  (4): Alternative  Cutoff  Values  for  the  Sample
1296-75  12i8-76  1968-77
7  0.44  0.44  0.52
(2.71)  (2.91)  (4.15)
R2  0.64  0.64  0.62
X2 definition  of the  experience  variable  is  employed  and  the  numbers  in
the  parenthesis  are  the "t"  values.22
TABLE  3
Equation  (5): Alternative Cutoff  Values  for  X2
X2 <  11  X2 :5 21  X2 < 31  X2 < 41
7  0.41  0.36  0.33  0.26
(2.71)  (3.10)  (3.13)  (2.46)
R2  0.75  0.67  0.63  0.61
The  numbers  in  the  parenthesis  are  the  "t"  values.
TABLE  4
*
Alternative  Functional  Forms
A  Bk
Hyperbola  Pade'  Hyperbola  Pade'
IV  a  b, - __  a  b
0.25  0.77  1.00  0.43  0.97  1.17
(2.19)  (2.09)  (2.41)  (5.52)  (2.20)  (3.00)
Part  A is  estimated  from  an equation  that  employs  dummy  variables  that
indicate  countries  and  months  in each  year.  Part  B ,  instead,  employs
dummy  variables  that  indicate  only  years  and  the  geographic  regions  in
which  the  countries  are  located. Both  use  the  X2  experience  variable.




Country  NMOR  Time  I  T.IN  s
Alteria  68  Mar. 73  83  1.33  7.8  82.8
Argentina.  87  July  73  93  1.15  7.8  100.7
Bahamas  5  Oct.  74  80  1.11  7.1  20.0
Bolivia  16  Apr. 74  59  1.90  6.2  39.2
Brazil  289  Dec.  72  102  1.47  8.8  75.6
Burma  4  June  77  35  1.87  4.6  24.0
Cameroon  5  July 74  61  2.00  7.0  21.4
Chile  66  Oct.  68  152  1.22  7.1  53.9
Colombia  36  Aug. 72  105  1.00  9.2  75.8
Costa-Rica  21  Sept.  73  87  1.34  7.7  30.0
Cyprus  7  Apr. 77  48  0.74  7.3  30.0
Ecuador  40  Mar.  75  74  1.10  7.8  61.7
Egypt  10  Feb.  74  87  1.54  6.1  55.2
El Salvador  5  June  74  18  1.73  6.4  19.0
Gabon  12  Mar. 74  84  1.84  7.6  37.0
Greece  49  Feb.  72  112  0.93  8.8  93.8
Honduras  7  Apr. 79  23  1.20  8.4  16.7
India  9  Nov. 77  40  0.74  7.1  122.8
Indonesia  53  Mar. 74  86  1.45  7.5  118.6
Iran  52  Mar. 72  79  1.07  6.8  90.2
Ivory  Coast  23  Mar. 74  87  1.68  7.9  41.4
Jamaica  13  June 73  96  1.76  7.3  38.0
Jordan  11  May 77  40  1.14  7.6  55.6
Kenya  4  July 72  93  1.34  5.8  59.2
Madagascar  5  Aug. 78  23  2.00  7.0  11.6
Malawi  5  Sept.  73  79  1.70  6.8  23.4
Malaysia  21  Jan. 71  123  0.90  8.1  159.724
CouDD;YtKBOR  Time  1  mi  a  T  L
Mauritius  4  Dec.  77  36  1.64  6.0  33.0
Mexico  192  Jan.  73  101  1.09  7.3  143.0
Morocco  17  Aug.  75  68  1.21  7.3  153.5
Nicaragua  7  May 73  30  1.65  7.1  26.6
Nigeria  31  Oct.  74  79  0.98  7.8  122.5
Pakistan  7  June  77  47  1.78  6.4  27.5
Panama  25  Oct.  73  87  1.57  7.2  62.2
Papua  New  Guinea  6  Dec. 77  41  0.96  8.5  48.0
Peru  40  Apr. 73  98  1.44  7.6  67.2
Philippines  95  Feb.  73  100  1.28  8.5  73.7
Portugal  49  May  73  97  0.94  7.0  71.5
Senegal  5  Jan.  73  100  1.98  8.0  26.5
South  Africa  34  Mar.  73  91  1.32  6.0  64.3
South  Korea  125  June  69  114  1.20  7.2  67.9
Spain  305  Feb.  73  100  1.05  7.4  55.0
Sri  Lanka  6  June 79  21  0.80  7.3  33.7
Sudan  4  Feb.  74  34  1.71  6.7  60.8
Taiwan  46  May 74  82  1.15  7.4  50.6
Thailand  25  Mar. 76  63  0.89  7.8  66.6
Trinidad-Tobago  8  June 74  77  0.86  8.1  62.6
Tunisia  9  Nov. 77  26  0.80  7.7  51.2
Turkey  9  July 75  48  1.56  5.0  135.8
Uruguay  13  Aug. 75  67  1.32  8.3  52.4
Venezuela  72  May 71  120  1.02  5.9  141.7
Yugoslavia  76  May 77  96  1.25  7.7  62.7
Zaire  6  Mar. 73  25  1.75  8.9  36.8
Zambia  4  June 73  76  1.54  8.0  65.7
Zimbabwe  5  Nov.  80  7  1.33  5.6  22.4
NBOr.  :  number  of times  the  country  has  borrowed.
TIME 1:  first  date  the  country  appears
TIN  :number  of  months  between  the  first  and  last  borrowing  of  the  country
s  :average spread  expressed  as percentage  point  above  LIBOR
T  :average loan  maturity
L  :average amount  of loans  in  $U.S.  million.25
TABLE  A.2
Equation  (4)*:  Impact  of Borrower  and  Loan  Characteristics  on Spreads
Parameter
Intercept  -3.54  Naturity  0.09
(0.11)  (0.003)
Syndicated  0.027  Investment/GNP  -1.51
(0.019)  (0.25)
Public  -0.14  GNP  growth  -0.10
(0.016)  (0.086)
Total  debt/GNP  0.67  Imports/GNP  -0.005
(0.17)  (0.12)
Reserves/GNP  -0.049  Rate  of  Devaluation  -0.04
(0.023)  (0.024)
Debt  Service/  0.003  Inflation  0.23
Exports  (0.003)  (0.09)
X2  0.25
(0.11)
R2  - 0.54  nobs.  - 2148
The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  standard  errors. Country  and  time  dummies
are  not  presented  here  but  they  are  available  from  the  author  upon request.26
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